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Abstract 
Political pressure often exists for rebating environmental levies, particularly when incomplete 
regulatory coverage allegedly creates an “unlevel playing field” with other, unregulated firms or 
industries. This paper assesses the conditions under which rebating environmental levies is justified for 
the regulated sector. It combines a theoretical approach based on second-best modeling with numerical 
simulations aimed at determining the most sensitive parameters. We find that if an adequate tax on 
production can be levied in the unregulated sector, no rebate is justified for the regulated sector. 
Moreover, even in the case of constrained taxation in the unregulated sector, a tax rebate or a subsidy in 
the regulated sector is not necessarily a welfare-increasing policy. The exception occurs when the goods 
of the competing sectors are close substitutes. We find that these kinds of policy contraints can be quite 
costly in terms of welfare. 
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Is There a Rationale for Rebating Environmental Levies? 
Alain L. Bernard, Carolyn Fischer, and Marc Vielle∗ 
 
Introduction 
Environmental taxes, like many tax policies with a narrow focus, have long been tied to 
related expenditures. For example, France has used effluent fees to subsidize investments in 
abatement equipment, and the United States has earmarked a “feedstock tax” on petroleum and 
chemical industries for financing Superfund cleanup operations.1 Such environmental taxes have 
primarily been the source of funds for environmental improvement policies; today, emission 
taxes are more often becoming the environmental policies themselves. When price mechanisms, 
such as taxes or tradable permits, are levied on emissions to create sufficient incentives for 
environmental protection, the question arises of how to distribute the accompanying revenues or 
rents. 
Political pressure exists for environmental regulators to design self-contained, revenue-
neutral policies.2 Owners of sunk capital argue for grandfathered emissions permits or other 
lump-sum transfers as compensation for lost investments or forgone profits. Those concerned 
about pre-existing distortions in the economy argue for using the revenues to reduce income and 
other taxes.3 Apart from the affected sectors, others, including the environmental community, 
worry about the incomplete coverage of environmental regulation. They argue that to maintain a 
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1 OECD 1993. 
2 Such revenue earmarking has been a focus in political economy, where earmarking can be shown to offer an 
enforcement mechanism for compromise among different interest groups (Wagner 1991). However, we abstract 
from the distributional issues behind these motivations. 
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level competitive playing field and to prevent leakage to unregulated producers, the revenues 
should be used to subsidize the production of regulated sectors. 
In the case of climate policy, energy-intensive industries argue that without output 
subsidies, a policy of emissions prices alone will distort the playing field with their competitors 
in nonparticipating countries. Distortions also can arise in domestic environmental policy when 
costly environmental regulations are unevenly applied due to technical, administrative, or other 
concerns. For example, firms or industries whose emissions can be easily measured can be made 
subject to environmental regulation, while those whose emissions cannot be monitored cost-
effectively would escape those regulatory costs. Policymakers have proposed earmarking 
mechanisms aimed at alleviating or canceling the distortionary effect of pollution taxation vis-à-
vis unregulated competitors. 
In particular, output-based rebating has emerged as a popular mechanism for integrating 
an offsetting subsidy into an environmental policy that raises production costs. Output-based 
rebating can take several forms: tradable performance standards, emissions taxes with rebates 
according to output shares, and output-allocated emissions permits. Although these policies are 
not typically considered together, they are in fact similar forms of the same scheme: they each 
simultaneously impose a marginal cost on emissions and offer a subsidy to production. 
Furthermore, the marginal value of that subsidy is often not fixed but rather tied to the average 
value of inframarginal emissions to the affected industry. 
Tradable performance standards require (allow) firms to buy (sell) permits for their 
output to the extent their emissions rates are above (below) the standard; the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) used tradable performance standards to phase out lead in gasoline. The 
tax-rebate scheme is exemplified by the Swedish program to reduce NOx emissions: producers 
pay a tax on actual emissions and at the end of the period are rebated the program revenues 
according to their output shares. Output-based allocation has surfaced as a proposed rule to 
distribute emissions permits for multiple pollutants, including NOx, in the U.S., as well as for 
CO2 in many countries’ discussions of setting up emissions trading systems to comply with the 
Kyoto Protocol targets for greenhouse gas emissions. Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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Some initial studies of rebating policies have been made, typically focusing on a specific 
type.4 Although some researchers have compared the distributional effects of rebating to 
traditional tax or permit policies, the issue of optimal second-best subsidies has not been studied. 
Fischer (2001) compares the efficiency effects of output-based rebating instruments as a class in 
a partial equilibrium framework but does not address pre-existing distortions or general 
equilibrium effects. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess, on theoretical grounds and through numerical 
simulations, the desirability of such measures for correcting the distortion between the regulated 
and unregulated sectors. Various corrective measures are considered, including output-based 
rebating, but also commodity taxes and subsidies more generally, in conjunction with 
constrained environmental regulation. If an emissions tax can be imposed on one sector but not 
another, the next recourse is a system of commodity taxation on all goods. One might expect that 
a positive rate of taxation on the good produced by the unregulated sector, coupled with a 
negative tax (a rebate) in the regulated sector, would prove desirable. Analysis developed in 
section 2 shows that only part of this intuition is true: it is (second-best) optimal to tax the 
unregulated sector, but not generally to rebate in the regulated sector. 
It also may be that the unregulated sector is untaxable, for various reasons. The rationale for a 
rebate in the regulated sector then appears stronger. However, as will be shown in section 3, this 
result is not guaranteed, and it is possible to show examples in which it is desirable that the 
regulated sector, though facing competition from an unregulated and nontaxable sector, be 
positively taxed.  Different examples to this effect are presented using a numerical model 
developed in section 4.  
Other scenarios with additional restrictions are assessed in section 5. These constraints 
include a single-sector pollution tax without rebating, mandatory full rebating of the pollution tax 
in the regulated sector, and full rebating in both sectors when pollution taxes are available for 
both. The welfare calculations reveal that policy constraints are costly, with possibly half of the 
gains of optimal environmental policy foregone when one sector’s emissions cannot be taxed 
directly.  
                                                 
4 Kerr and Maré (1996) perform empirical analysis of the lead phasedown; Sterner and Höglund (1998) focus on the 
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Section 1: Model and First-Best Benchmark 
In this section, we introduce the basic model that will be used to assess the consequences 
of the various fiscal and earmarking constraints on environmental policy. We begin by 
presenting the benchmark scenario, based on Pigouvian taxation and Pareto efficiency. 
A. The Model 
The “minimal” representation of the economy necessary to cope with the issues at hand 
involves a model with two sectors (regulated and unregulated), two goods, and two factors of 
production (labor and emissions). Labor is usually considered in optimal taxation and second-
best methodology as the third good, entering as an argument in production and utility functions. 
As there is a degree of liberty in setting the two price systems (consumption prices and 
production prices), labor is usually (without loss of generality) taken as the numéraire and 
untaxed good (with its price set to unity). When second-best constraints apply, the model is then 
of the Boiteux type, as opposed to the Diamond and Mirrlees type.5 Notations and relations of 
the model are given below. 
Notation: 
Q1  =  Production in the regulated sector 
Q2  =  Production in the unregulated sector 
L1  =  Labor demand in the regulated sector 
L2  =  Labor demand in the unregulated sector 
L  = Labor  supply 
C1  =  Demand for good produced in the regulated sector 
C2  =  Demand for good produced in the unregulated sector
E1  =  Emissions of pollutant in the regulated sector 
E2  =  Emissions of pollutant in the unregulated sector 
                                                 
5 See Bernard 1999. Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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Specifications: 
The household sector comprises a representative consumer, allowing us to avoid 
consideration of equity in the analysis. Utility is a function of consumption of both goods and 
leisure: 
) 1 , , ( 2 1 L C C U U − = . 
Households also suffer disutility as a function of total emissions:6 
) ( 2 1 E E D + =δ . 
The welfare function, then, is the difference between consumption utility and emissions 
disutility, which we have assumed to be separable:7 
). ( ) 1 , , ( 2 1 2 1 E E L C C U
D U W




Production in each sector (i = 1, 2) is a function of labor and emissions: 
) , ( i i i i E L f Q = . 
Equivalently, labor in each sector can be specified as a function of output and emissions: 
) , ( i i i i E Q L L = . 
Note that there is no link between the two sectors through intermediate consumption. This link 
will be considered below in a special case but not generally in the model, because intermediate 
consumption is not a major aspect of the issue. 
B. The First-Best Case 
The optimal fiscal and environmental policy is obtained when welfare is maximized only 
under physical constraints, production functions, and market-clearing relations. Primal and dual 
(Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for optimality are given below. 
                                                 
6 An alternative—and equivalent—formalization would be to impose a limit to total damages; the shadow price of 
the constraint then represents the value of the marginal damage.  Simulations would then compare results given an 
emissions target, such as with a cap-and-trade policy, rather than given an emissions tax that equalizes marginal 
costs and benefits. 
7 Separable preferences ensure that in the standard case of second-best taxation with a revenue requirement, optimal 
emissions taxes are Pigouvian while commodity taxes are set according to optimal tax principles (Cremer and 
Gahvari 2001). Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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Unconstrained Policy Problem 
The social planner maximizes 
), ( ) 1 , , ( 2 1 2 1 E E L C C U + − − δ  
subject to the constraints that demand equal supply for each good and for labor (presented with 
their shadow values): 
. 0 ) , ( ) , ( ) (
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Interpretation in Terms of Market Prices 
Dual variables  ω π π and , , 2 1  are classically defined as “social marginal utilities” of the 
corresponding goods—that is, the increase in welfare brought by the availability of an additional 
unit of the related good. Results of the optimization process can be interpreted through a 
comparison with market prices, defined in the consumption sphere by the marginal utility of 
goods, and in the production sphere by the marginal productivity. To this end, we introduce the Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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following additional notation: 
 
p1  =  Consumer prices in the regulated sector 
p2  =  Consumer prices in the unregulated sector 
q1  =  Producer prices in the regulated sector 
q2  =  Producer prices in the unregulated sector 
w  = Labor  wage 
τ1  =  Tax on emissions in the regulated sector 
τ 2  =  Tax on emissions in the unregulated sector 
T  =  Refund of tax revenues (Lump-sum transfer)
Consumer Problem 
Taking pollution externalities as given, the representative household maximizes utility 
with respect to consumption and leisure,  
) 1 , , ( 2 1 L C C U −  
subject to a budget constraint: 
. 0 ) ( 2 2 1 1 = − − + T wL Q p Q p λ  




































The representative firm in each sector i chooses output and emissions to maximize 
profits:   
i i i i i i i E E Q wL Q q τ − − ) , (,  Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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Substituting these expressions into the first-order conditions from the planner’s problem, 
we recover the classic result that the consumer prices (relative to the wage) are equal to the 





































As for the externality, the condition for optimality implies 
. 2 1 ω
δ
τ τ w = =  
Thus, when pollution can be taxed in each sector, the optimal policy is to do so at the marginal 
social cost of pollution, while leaving goods untaxed (and unsubsidized). 
So far, we have obtained classical Pigouvian results. The question at hand is what 
happens when sector 2 cannot be regulated to control pollution. The reasons may be 
•  technical, as when firm-level monitoring of emissions is infeasible or prohibitively 
costly (for example, a sector with a great number of small actors, like the 
transportation industry);  Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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•  jurisdictional, as is the case when some polluters operate outside the regulator’s 
reach, such as outside the particular controlled industry (like electricity) or across 
state or national boundaries; or 
•  “political,” as when the sector is considered vulnerable or is otherwise influential (for 
example, steel producers or farmers). 
Two polar cases will be considered: 
•  the output of the unregulated sector can be taxed (or subsidized), as can that of the 
regulated sector; and 
•  the unregulated sector must also remain untaxed, while the regulated sector can be 
taxed or subsidized as well as regulated. 
These issues of policy constraints are dealt with in the two following sections, using 
different mathematical tools. Additional constraints will subsequently be evaluated numerically. 
Section 2: The Case of an Unregulated but Taxable Sector (Second Best 1) 
By definition, the unregulated sector receives no direct price signal for emitting pollution; 
consequently, it sets its emissions at a level such that the marginal productivity is always zero. 
However, this level is logically limited, whatever the expected production (else emissions would 
be infinite), and we have to represent this property in the specification of the production 
function. More precisely, the production function must be such that when the marginal 
productivity of emitted pollution is set to zero, labor and emitted pollution become simple 












A. Second Best 1 
When sector 2 cannot be regulated, Pareto efficiency is no longer attainable, and one 
must resort to a second-best approach. However, in the present case, the mathematical structure 
of the problem is fairly simple and does not require the more complicated apparatus of second-
best models that will be needed for the next scenario. Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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Compared with the previous model, what is changed is that in sector 2 the supply 
function  ) , ( 2 2 2 E Q L  is replaced by both a labor-demand function ) ( 2 2 Q L ϕ =  and a pollution-
emitting function  ) ( 2 2 Q E ψ = .  
Constrained Problem 
The planner maximizes 
)) ( ( ) 1 , , ( 2 1 2 1 Q E L C C U ψ δ + − −  
subject to the constraints 
. 0 ) ( ) , ( ) (
0 ) (
0 ) (













Optimality conditions then become 
. ) (
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Interpretation in Terms of Market Prices 
Production prices now diverge from consumption prices, the difference representing the 
commodity tax system (wage, being taken as the numéraire, can be set to 1 in the two price 



























Identifying the systems of market and dual prices gives Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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These results are particularly simple: 
•  emissions in sector 1 are taxed according to marginal damages; 
•  there is neither tax nor rebate for commodity 1; and 
•  commodity 2 is taxed according to the marginal damages of the associated emissions.  
The tax rate on sector 2 equals the pollution tax applied in sector 1 multiplied by the 
marginal propensity to emit. When ψ is the identity function, the optimal commodity tax is 
exactly equal to the pollution tax τ , and receipts of the commodity tax are then equal to the 
receipts that would accrue from a pollution tax (given the zero marginal product constraint on 
emissions). However, the level of emitted pollution is not the same as in the first-best case 
because the incentive effect is not at work. Then the optimized unregulated equilibrium exhibits 
a welfare loss, which can be measured and will be calculated in numerical simulations. 
Zero commodity taxation (more precisely, no rebate and no subsidy) in the first sector is 
a result that raises questions about the underlying assumptions. In fact, an important assumption 
in the model is that the two sectors are independent in production and not linked to each other, 
such as through intermediate consumption. Considering the case in which each sector uses the 
good produced by the other sector as a factor of production changes the picture. There now may 
be reasons to tax good 1 in order to give a price signal—however small—to the other sector. 
B. Unregulated Sector with Intermediate Consumption 
Let us introduce Leontieff coefficients representing intermediate consumption. A unit of 
production in sector 1 requires  1 γ  units of good 2, while producing a unit of good 2 requires  2 γ  
units of good 1.  The necessary change in the above model regards the market-clearing relations, 
which become 
. 0 ) (
0 ) (
1 1 2 2 2








While the condition for the optimal emissions tax in sector 1 remains the same, the new 
optimality conditions for production are Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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Substituting in the market price relations from the consumer problem, as well as the optimal tax 






















































































Sector 2 is still taxed according to the emissions embodied in its production, inflated 
somewhat by the interaction of the goods through intermediate consumption.8  Meanwhile, sector 
1 in this case is taxed in proportion to the quantity of goods used in the second sector as 
intermediate consumption.  If the Leontieff coefficients can reasonably be considered small, we 
                                                 
8 An additional unit of consumer good 2 requires  2 γ  units of good 1, which requires  2 1γ γ  of 2 which requires 
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1 γ γ  of 2, and so on.   Thus, another consumer good 2 involves emissions from 
2 1







∞ i  units of good 2. Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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find again that good 1 is (approximately) untaxed and commodity 2 is (approximately) taxed at a 
level equal to the pollution tax applied in sector 1. 
Section 3: Unregulated and Untaxable Sector (Second Best 2) 
When sector 2 is unregulated, we have seen that its emissions adjust so that the marginal 
product is always zero.  A planner then cannot influence emissions directly, but rather indirectly 
through the output choice, of which emissions are then a straightforward function.  When sector 
2 cannot be taxed, the planner can no longer affect the output choice directly either.  Output in 
sector 2 then becomes a function of the general equilibrium of the system. 
Taking into account direct constraints—or indirect, such as budget constraints—on the 
price system requires resorting to the classic second-best apparatus. This method was first set out 
by Boiteux in his seminal paper of 1953 and afterward implemented by several economists 
addressing optimal taxation, including Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1972), Guesnerie (1995), Sandmo (1975), and Bradford and Rosen (1975), among others. It is 
based on supply and demand functions (instead of utility and production functions) and indirect 
utility functions.9 
A. Second Best 1, Revisited 
Using the new framework, let us present again the previous problem of an unregulated 
but taxable sector 2. The critical variables are now not quantities but prices: the production 
prices, the pollution tax, the consumption prices (and then implicitly the commodity taxes), and 
the household’s income R. Labor is chosen as the numéraire and the untaxed good (without loss 
of generality), with its price is set to 1. The second-best problem can now be written in the 
following form. 
Second Best 1(b) 
The planner maximizes 
[ ] ) , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( 2 2 1 1 2 1 w q E w q E R p p U + − τ δ  
                                                 
9 However, it is possible to set out second-best models in the primal language of production and utility functions 
(see Bernard 1977) and the equivalence with dual language easily checked (see Bernard 1990) Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
14   
subject to the constraints 
. 0 ) , , ( ) , ( ) , , ( ) (
0 ) , ( ) , , ( ) (
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The global system comprises nine relations and nine variables and, although it is not 
guaranteed in all circumstances, generally there is a unique solution. The solution can be 
obtained by transforming the system of optimality conditions and replacing uncompensated 
derivatives of demand with compensated derivatives (the sign of which is known, under the 
assumption that the utility function is quasi-convex10). 
Effectively, adding equation  ) ( 1 p  to equation  ) (R , multiplied by  1 C  (and similarly for 
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= λ  is the marginal utility of income,  
                                                 
10 More precisely, the matrix of compensated demand derivatives is negative semidefinite. Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 























=  is the derivative of demand in commodity i with respect to income. 
The above system is identically verified for  w p p = = = ω π π ; ; 2 2 1 1 . Assuming 
uniqueness of the solution then shows that the social values of goods are equal to the 
consumption prices. 
The same reasoning applied to sector 1 shows that the production prices are equal to the 
social values of goods, and then that  1 1 q p = , meaning that no commodity taxation is warranted in 
sector 1.  As for sector 2, the dual relation is as presented before.  Commodity 2 is (optimally) 
taxed at a rate equal to the pollution tax (as applying to sector 1) times the marginal associated 
emissions.   
B. Second Best 2: Constraint on Commodity Taxation in Sector 2 
Suppose now that unregulated sector 2 cannot be taxed at all.  A unilateral tax on sector 
1’s emissions would then raise the relative price of good 1.  To alleviate the distortion to 
competition, it may be desirable to subsidize sector 1—that is, impose a negative commodity tax. 
Such a result is not assured, however; it depends, as is always the case in second-best analysis, 
on the substitutability or complementarity between the three goods—commodities 1 and 2 and 
leisure. 
Imposing a zero tax in sector 2 (i.e., the condition that  2 2 p q = ) modifies the 
optimization problem and the optimality conditions in the following way: 
•  p2 replaces q2 in the target function and in the constraints (π2) and (ω); 




















































ω π ω π π δ  
The global system (primal and dual) consists now of eight relations and eight variables, 
reflecting the limitation to two of the policy instruments (the pollution tax and the commodity 
tax, both of which apply to sector 1). The above formula clearly shows that the social values of 
goods no longer coincide with the consumption prices. Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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As a consequence, the optimal tax on commodity 1 is no longer equal to zero. A negative 
value (i.e., a tax rebate or a subsidy) could normally be expected to alleviate the distortion 
between the two sectors vis-à-vis pollution abatement. However, as is usual in second-best 
models, no general intuitive or qualitative result can be exhibited, though in some circumstances 
“rules of thumb” may emerge (Bernard 1990). A thorough understanding of the general 
equilibrium workings of the system can come only from numerical simulations, showing how the 
main parameters affect results. 
Section 4: Numerical Model 
Though it is not the most general specification, a convenient one for the subsequent 
numerical analysis is the two-level nested CES utility function. For three goods, X1, X2, and X3, 
its formulation is 
[ ] µ µ µ
1
3 ) 1 (
− − − − + = X u uZ U  
with 
[ ] ν ν ν
1
2 1 ) 1 (
− − − − + = X v vX Z  
This function is homogenous of degree one and separable; although it is not the most 
general specification, it allows us to capture various possible relations of substitutability and 
complementarity between good 1, good 2, and leisure. The choice of the values of the elasticity 










2 s  in the nest. The various 
possible combinations of nesting (the two goods together, or one good and leisure) yield a broad 
range of situations. 
A. Specification of the Production Function 
Recall that when the unregulated sector receives no price signal for emitting pollution, 
labor and emitted pollution are functions of the level of production.  A fairly general 
specification for a sector production function may be of the following form (leaving off the 















where ) (⋅ θ  is the inverse function of emissions, and Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 













x x g β . 
We assume that φ , g, and θ  are monotonic increasing functions. 
Effectively, the condition that marginal productivity of pollution equals zero implies that 












Since ) (E θ  is monotonic and strictly increasing, it must be that  0 ) (
2 1 = − = ′
− − n n nx nx x g , the 
solution of which is  1 = x , implying  Q E = ) ( θ . Then, in the case of no emissions tax, the factor 








































































β α , 
which in cases of a zero emissions price reduces to  2 2
2
2 2 2 5 . c Q L + − = β α  . (That L is not equal 
to zero when Q is zero is not a problem, since we consider the working of the production 
function only for sufficiently high values of output). 


















3 2 β α , 
where  Q E m / =  is the emissions rate (sector indices are not noted but implicit). The parameter 
α 2  represents the slope of direct marginal production costs (in terms of labor units needed), Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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while  β  shifts those marginal costs upward, essentially to the extent that the emissions rate falls 
below 1, the zero-marginal-product rate of emissions. 
B. Calibration 
As is the case in general equilibrium modeling, the first step is calibration to a reference 





Q1=C1 0.5 ; Q2=C2 0.5
L1 0.23 ; L2 0.24
E1 0.5 ; E2 0.5
As for the main parameters of the production functions, the following values were taken 
as numerical examples, representing a case in which pollution abatement raises labor costs more 
in sector 1 than in sector 2.  
α1 1;α2 1
β1 0.04 ; β2 0.02
Calibration to the above scenario sets the labor residual, c, for each sector.  For most 
scenarios the value of  2 β  is not very important, since in the absence of an emissions charge in 
that sector, the term functions like a residual in the production function and does not affect 
marginal labor costs.  It does, however, matter in terms of relative welfare losses.  Raising  2 β  
raises abatement costs in sector 2, meaning less would be done in the presence of a direct 
emissions tax.  Therefore, the relative welfare loss from policy restrictions is decreasing in  2 β .   Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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In sum, we consider a general scenario involving products with similar production and 
emissions profiles, the latter being identical and equal to output in the absence of regulation. The 
key parameters for optimal tax values are the elasticities of substitution between the goods.11 
a) Specification I: Nesting of Commodities 1 and 2 
For the utility function, we first nest the two commodities, varying the values of the 
elasticity of substitution within the nest and between the nest and leisure in the global utility 
function. With this specification, we investigate two main scenarios: 
•  commodities 1 and 2 are complements: values of the elasticity of substitution are, 
respectively, 0.75 (in the function) and 0.25 (in the nest); and 
•  commodities 1 and 2 are substitutes: values of the elasticity of substitution are, 
respectively, 0.25 and 0.75. 
The results show that the magnitude of tax and welfare differences as the externality cost 
δ varies from 0 to 0.4, compared with first-best and Second Best 1.12  They clearly demonstrate 
the importance of the substitutability between the two commodities.  
The rate of compensatory rebate in sector 1 is the ratio of tax rebates or subsidies to 
pollution taxes raised in that sector. 13 In the case of a high level of complementarity, the optimal 
rebate rate in the regulated sector is very small, and it can even be negative (i.e., positive 
taxation) for lower levels of marginal damage.  When the two commodities are instead 
substitutes, the compensating rebate is high, with a rate close to 100% (a little less for low 
damages, a little more for high damages).  Figure 1 contrasts these cases.  Of course, the 
numerical results depend on the precise values of the two elasticities of substitution, but the 
general picture is that compensation is unjustified when the two goods are complements, and 
justified when they are close substitutes. 
                                                 
11 As seen in Section 3, emissions intensity in the unregulated sector is important for determining the second-best 
commodity tax; naturally, it will also affect the degree of optimal rebating, given the substitutability of the 
commodities. In the extreme case where sector 2 is nonpolluting, the optimal commodity tax is zero; since not being 
able to tax the output of sector 2 is then not actually a constraint, no rebate would be warranted. In general, since the 
effect of emissions intensity is primarily proportional, it is not a focus of the modelling effort. 
12 The underlying assumptions regarding the use of emissions in each production function are also important. 
13 Stated mathematically, the rebate rate is 1 1 1 / E C t τ − . Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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These results can be explained by the nature of the substitution between the three goods, 
commodities 1 and 2 and leisure. When the two commodities are complements (less substitutable 
between each other than between both of them and leisure), a price differential between them is 
not efficient for pollution abatement because it does not significantly change their relative 
demand. Efficient pollution abatement is easily reached (i.e., at not too great a cost) by 
substituting leisure for consumption goods, and the shift occurs. As shown in Table 1 (appended 
due to its size), the prices of commodities increase with pollution abatement, which means that 
the purchasing power of labor decreases, and correspondingly so does labor supply by 
households, leaving more room for leisure. 
On the other hand, when the two consumption goods are substitutes (again relative to 
leisure), substitution works mainly between the goods, and less between both of them and 
leisure. Table 2 (also appended) shows that, in contrast to the previous case, the prices of the 
commodities remain rather low in spite of taxation, while the labor supply remains rather high. 
Obviously, when compensation is advocated for the regulated sector, the assumption is that the 
sector faces stiff competition from an unregulated, untaxed sector. 
Regarding the actual level of taxation, it is important to note that in all of the cases thus 
far, the constrained optimal emission tax rate is higher than in the first-best case.  When sector 2 
cannot be properly regulated, emissions are higher and their damages more costly in marginal 
welfare terms.  Sector 1 then has to do more of the work of emissions reduction.  However, other 
policy constraints may cause the equilibrium emission tax rate to fall below that of the first-best 
scenario.  (These cases will be shown in Figures 3 and 4 in the next section.) Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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b) Specification II: Nesting of Commodity 1 and Leisure  
Nesting commodity 1 and leisure in the utility function gives somewhat comparable 
results. The main difference is that complementarity between commodities 1 and 2 requires a 
low elasticity of substitution both in the nest and in the utility function. As a result, 
complementarity between the goods also requires complementarity with leisure. 
Simulations were performed with s1=0.85 and s2=0.15, and with s1=0.15 and s2=0.85. The 
first set of parameters corresponds to a higher degree of substitutability between the two 
commodities than the second set. Effectively, the optimal rate of compensatory rebate is always 
higher than 100% in the first case and smaller than 30% in the second case, as shown in the 
following table. However, we never obtain a “negative” compensation (i.e., a positive tax). 
 
Rebate Rate with Specification II 
δ  0.025 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.4
s1=0.85 and s2=0.15 125.2% 134.4% 143.9% 148.0% 148.5% 141.1%
s1=0.15 and s2=0.85 11.8% 13.2% 15.4% 17.3% 21.1% 27.6%
 
Section 5: Comparing Constraints on Taxation 
To place these results in a policy context, we would like to evaluate the effects of policy 
constraints on optimal tax rates and on welfare.  In addition to the first-best policy and the two 
second-best policies analyzed in sections 2 and 3, we identify several more and compare the 
results in Table 3.  These other second-best configurations are easily considered in the given 
framework.   
To give a baseline for comparison of the welfare gains from each policy, we calculate the 
welfare achieved when no environmental policy is implemented (“No Taxation” scenario). As 
another potential benchmark, we offer the scenario of nothing but a pollution tax in sector 1 
(Second Best 3), representing when rebates and commodity taxation are both unavailable. 
Next, even though we have demonstrated it is not usually optimal, since it is frequently 
advocated we consider two cases of a mandatory 100% rebate of the pollution tax in sector 1. 
One imposes it when commodity taxation is unavailable for sector 2 (Second Best 4), and the 
other imposes full rebating when the commodity tax is available (Second Best 5).  In the latter Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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case, the requirement affects not only the optimal pollution tax rate in sector 1, but also the 
commodity tax on good 2. Comparison with Second Best 1 and 2 gives a measure of the 
additional welfare loss generated by such policies and the impact on the choice of tax rate. 
Similarly, we present the case where complete rebating of environmental revenues is 
mandated, although direct pollution taxes are available in both sectors (Second Best 6); the 
constraint that all revenue be given back in output subsidies to the producing sectors creates a 
distortion compared to lump-sum rebating.14 
Table 3. Comparison of Scenarios 
 
Pollution Tax in 
Sector 1 
Pollution Tax in 
Sector 2 
CommodityTax 
in Sector 1 
CommodityTax 
in Sector 2 
Pareto  Yes  Yes  Yes (Opt.= 0)  Yes (Opt.= 0) 
No Taxation  No No No No 
Second Best 1: 
2 Exempt from Pollution Tax  Yes No Yes Yes 
Second Best 2: 
2 Exempt From All  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Second Best 3: 
 Pollution tax in 1 Alone  Yes  No  No  No 
Second Best 4: 
Full Rebating in Sector 1  Yes No  100%  Rebate  No 
Second Best 5: 
Full Rebating in Sector 1  Yes  No  100% Rebate  Yes 
Second Best 6: 
Pareto Tax with Full Rebate  Yes  Yes  100% Rebate Overall 
 
A. Effects of Policy Constraints on Tax Rates 
The rate of recovery is defined as the percent of emissions that are implicitly taxed at the 
rate faced by sector 1.15  In sector 2, the recovery rate is by definition 100% in Second Best 1, 
                                                 
14 An important assumption here is that no distorting taxes, like a labor tax, already exist. This extension will be 
discussed in the conclusion. 
15 Otherwise stated, the rate of recovery in sector 2 is the ratio of the receipts accruing from the commodity taxation 
to the receipts that would accrue from a pollution tax, or  ) /( 2 2 2 E C t τ . Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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since all embodied emissions are taxed, and zero in Second Best 2, since no tax is allowed.  
However, when 100% rebating is mandated in sector 1, the rate of recovery in sector 2 will vary 
according to the degree of substitutability. 
Figure 2 compares second-best scenario 5 with scenario 1, with respect to the rate of 
recovery in sector 2.  In the case of complements, a full rebate in sector 1 is too high; to 
compensate, more than 100% of the pollution implicit in the production of section 2 is taxed.  In 
a sense, the tax on 2 is serving to tax the inefficiently subsidized complement.  In the case of 
substitutes, the rebate rate is closer to that in Second Best 2, causing the optimal rate of recovery 
to be lower.  In other words, the subsidy is inefficiently diverting consumption toward Sector 1, 
and taxing in full the pollution implicit in the substitute output would exacerbate this effect. 
 


























We noted before that for second-best scenarios 1 and 2, the constrained optimal emission 
tax rate is always higher than in the first-best case, regardless of whether the goods are 
complements or substitutes.  For other policy constraints, however, the degree of substitutability 
matters in determining where the equilibrium emission tax rate falls compared to the first-best 
and other scenarios.  Figure 3 shows emission tax rates for the complements case; Figure 4 
shows them for substitutes. 
For example, compare taxing pollution in only one of the polluting sectors (Second Best 
3) to Second Best 2, which adds the rebating option.  In the case of complements, we see that the 
tax rate is generally somewhat higher for 3, as it does all the work for encouraging emissions 
reduction in sector 1 and its complement in sector 2.  Correspondingly, overall emissions are Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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lower.  For substitutes, the opposite is true: the tax rate is lower, since it tends to divert 
consumption to the unregulated good, and overall emissions are higher. 
In Second Best 5, the mandatory rebate is always too high, since taxing good 2 is still an 
option.  In the complements case, the emissions tax rate responds by falling below the first-best 
case, since the recovery rate in sector 2 is high.  In the case of substitutes, the recovery rate in 
sector 2 is below that of Second Best 1 (as seen in Figure 2), and the emissions tax rate is then 
rises above that in the first-best case, since more emissions reduction must be done in sector 1 to 
compensate.  When nothing is recovered from sector 2, as in the case of Second Best 4, the 
emissions tax must also serve to adjust the value of the mandatory rebate, resulting in an even 
higher emissions tax in the substitutes case. 
With Second Best 6, we get the unsurprising result that mandating the rebate subsidy 
raises the costs (or diminishes the effectiveness) of imposing an emissions tax; therefore, the tax 
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B. Effects of Policy Constraints on Welfare 
We have presented how different constraints on policymaking affect optimal tax and 
rebate rates.  The ultimate question is how the constraints, given these optimal responses to them, 
affect welfare.  The following Figures depict the welfare losses of each scenario, compared to 
optimal Pigouvian policy, for the two polar cases of complementarity and substitutability (as 
defined with specification I of the utility function). 
Clearly, inaction is very costly in terms of welfare.  Overall, we see that welfare costs 
increase with the stringency of the restrictions.   
For the unregulated sector, we showed that the optimal second-best policy is a 
commodity tax at a level equal to the pollution tax in the regulated sector times the implicit 
emissions, without any rebate for the regulated sector.  Notably, looking at Second Best 1 in the 
Figures, we see that with this single restriction of no pollution regulation for one sector, even 
with the option of commodity taxation, roughly half the welfare gains from environmental policy 
are foregone. 
In the case of an unregulated and untaxable sector, the rationale for rebating pollution 
taxes in the regulated sector depends primarily on whether they are really in close competition.  
The closer the substitutes, the more justification there is for rebating. As such, the substitutes Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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case is probably the context that advocates of rebating usually have in mind. But our main 
conclusion is that built-in compensatory measures, such as rebating pollution taxes in the 
regulated sector, may in other contexts do more harm than good. In any case, taxing polluting 
sectors, through commodity taxation if taxing pollution directly is impossible, is always 
preferable. 
Examples can be seen in Figures 5 and 6, portraying the relative welfare losses of the 
different scenarios.  In general, welfare losses grow with the increasing restrictiveness of the 
policy constraints. Second Best 2, 3 and 5 are all worse than 1 and Second Best 4 is worse than 2 
and 4, by design.  Interestingly, Second Best 5 always outperforms Second Best 2 in our 
scenarios: that means the option to tax the emissions embodied in sector 2’s output is more 
important than flexibility in setting the rebate rate, even for complements.  However, whether 
mandatory rebating is better than no rebating depends on the degree of substitutability between 
the commodities. 
Taxing pollution in only one of the polluting sectors without any compensatory rebate or 
commodity taxation in the other sector (Second Best 3) achieves the least welfare gain of any of 
the policies considered when the goods are substitutes.  In this case, the tax diverts more 
consumption toward the unregulated sector and it becomes a weaker instrument for reducing 
emissions.  On the other hand, in the case of complements, when little or no rebate was justified 
anyway, the welfare loss is very similar to Second Best 2.  Meanwhile, mandatory rebating in 
sector 1 without commodity taxation in 2 (Second Best 4) implies an even greater welfare loss 
than no rebating at all in this complements case. 
Second Best 6 models the case where the emissions of each sector can be taxed directly, 
but the revenues must be refunded by subsidies to output in both industries, rather than in lump-
sum form to consumers.  The resulting distortion to the leisure-consumption decision creates a 
welfare loss; however, since the emissions of both industries are taxed, the loss is less severe 
than when one industry cannot be regulated. 
 Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 




























We have considered the arguments for allocating environmental revenues in the form of 
output subsidies to affected industries.  The desirability of such a policy depends on the Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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circumstances of the constraint on policy making and on whether the goods of the regulated 
industry are substitutes or complements with those of the unregulated industry.  
As usual, the first-best policy is always to have a full set of policy tools.  Then the 
emissions of each industry are taxed directly, and the revenues are refunded in a non-distorting 
manner to consumers. 
However, if for some reason the emissions of one of the polluting sectors cannot be 
regulated directly, the next-best response is to tax those emissions indirectly.  A tax should be 
levied on the output of the unregulated sector, reflecting the extent to which emissions are 
incorporated in its production.  Meanwhile, a direct tax on the regulated sector’s emissions 
remains in place, and the revenues are again refunded in lump sum; no rebate is justified. 
If taxing the unregulated sector’s output is not possible either, then an output-based 
rebate to the regulated sector is justified, but only to the extent that (i) the goods are close 
substitutes and (ii) the unregulated sector is polluting.  Any surplus (or shortfall) in revenue is 
transferred in lump sum to (from) consumers. 
Imposing a 100% rebate for the regulated sector represents an additional policy constraint 
and thus reduces welfare compared to the previous scenario.  Obviously, such a requirement is 
least costly in situations when the optimal rebate rate is close to one, such as if both the goods 
and their emissions profiles are similar.  In a complements situation, a mandatory full rebate is 
worse than no rebate at all. In any case, the loss in terms of flexibility for setting the rebate can 
be more than made up for if a tax can also be levied on the output of the unregulated sector. 
Policy constraints can be quite costly, and a general-equilibrium framework is important 
for understanding the extent of those costs.  The effectiveness of the remaining policy tools 
depends critically on the elasticities of substitution between the polluting goods and with leisure.  
For complements, taxes or subsidies on commodities are weak tools since they have similar 
effects on the untaxed sector.  Meanwhile, the emissions tax then also has the spillover effect of 
reducing output in the unregulated sector.  For substitutes, on the other hand, cost increases in 
the regulated sector have the extra effect of shifting output toward the unregulated sector.  As a 
result, an emissions tax in one sector alone is a weaker tool for reducing emissions, while output 
taxes and subsidies offer a more powerful remedy. 
In a final note, almost all of the second-best configurations considered here involve lump-
sum transfers from government to households—lump-sum grants when the total amount of fiscal 
receipts is positive, lump-sum levies when negative.  The exception is Second Best 6, in which 
emissions in both sectors are taxed, but the revenues are rebated back to both industries; this Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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100% overall rebating requirement is essentially a balanced-budget constraint.  Not only is the 
feasibility of lump-sum transfers debatable, but environmental taxes normally operate in a world 
with pre-existing taxes.  These taxes, notably on labor and consumption goods, leave leisure as 
an untaxed good. Thus, distortions to behavior are pre-existing when the environmental tax is 
levied and the use of the revenue has important impacts.  In subsequent work, we will assess the 
effect of adding a constraint of a balanced budget (i.e., that the sum of all receipts from taxation, 
both pollution taxes and commodity taxes, be equal to a revenue requirement) when leisure 
remains an untaxed good.  In this case rebating, which tends to function like a labor tax 
reduction, can be welfare improving over lump-sum redistribution. Resources for the Future  Bernard, Fischer, and Vielle 
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Table 1. Commodities 1 and 2 as Complements 
No Pollution First Best Second Best 1 Second Best 2
δ 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.4 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.4 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.4
p1 1 1.049 1.091 1.169 1.245 1.403 1.668 1.051 1.095 1.181 1.268 1.461 1.840 1.052 1.098 1.187 1.278 1.481 1.874
p2 1 1.045 1.081 1.147 1.212 1.344 1.563 1.061 1.125 1.270 1.436 1.853 2.777 0.998 0.996 0.990 0.983 0.966 0.932
w 1 111111 111111 111111
q1 1 1.049 1.091 1.169 1.245 1.403 1.668 1.051 1.095 1.181 1.268 1.461 1.840 1.051 1.096 1.183 1.273 1.477 1.893
q2 1 1.045 1.081 1.147 1.212 1.344 1.563 0.983 0.965 0.927 0.887 0.804 0.672 0.998 0.996 0.990 0.983 0.966 0.932
t1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 -0.019
t2 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.161 0.343 0.549 1.049 2.105 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
C1 0.5 0.492 0.484 0.469 0.455 0.427 0.387 0.493 0.486 0.472 0.458 0.427 0.372 0.493 0.486 0.473 0.460 0.434 0.391
C2 0.5 0.492 0.485 0.472 0.458 0.432 0.393 0.492 0.482 0.463 0.444 0.402 0.336 0.499 0.498 0.495 0.491 0.483 0.466
L1 0.23 0.224 0.221 0.215 0.211 0.204 0.197 0.225 0.222 0.218 0.215 0.209 0.201 0.225 0.223 0.219 0.217 0.217 0.222
L2 0.24 0.236 0.233 0.228 0.225 0.218 0.211 0.232 0.223 0.205 0.187 0.152 0.103 0.239 0.238 0.235 0.232 0.223 0.207
L 0.47 0.460 0.453 0.443 0.435 0.422 0.408 0.457 0.445 0.423 0.402 0.361 0.304 0.464 0.461 0.454 0.449 0.440 0.429
1-L 0.53 0.540 0.547 0.557 0.565 0.578 0.592 0.543 0.555 0.577 0.598 0.639 0.696 0.536 0.539 0.546 0.551 0.560 0.571
RG 1.53 1.570 1.599 1.646 1.687 1.758 1.852 1.582 1.630 1.723 1.816 2.008 2.314 1.552 1.569 1.597 1.622 1.670 1.739
E1 0.5 0.414 0.374 0.327 0.296 0.253 0.210 0.414 0.374 0.326 0.294 0.247 0.194 0.414 0.375 0.327 0.296 0.251 0.201
E2 0.5 0.381 0.338 0.292 0.263 0.224 0.185 0.492 0.482 0.463 0.444 0.402 0.336 0.499 0.498 0.495 0.491 0.483 0.466
E 1 0.795 0.712 0.619 0.559 0.477 0.394 0.906 0.857 0.790 0.738 0.649 0.530 0.913 0.873 0.822 0.787 0.734 0.667
τ1 0 -0.077 -0.158 -0.330 -0.515 -0.925 -1.651 -0.078 -0.161 -0.343 -0.549 -1.049 -2.105 -0.078 -0.160 -0.343 -0.549 -1.055 -2.166
τ2 0 -0.077 -0.158 -0.330 -0.515 -0.925 -1.651 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
U 0.5103 0.4884 0.4697 0.4366 0.4073 0.3557 0.2907 0.4866 0.4646 0.4236 0.3854 0.3162 0.2279 0.4865 0.4643 0.4220 0.3818 0.3059 0.2011
π1 1.051 1.095 1.181 1.268 1.461 1.840 1.051 1.096 1.183 1.273 1.477 1.893
π2 1.061 1.125 1.270 1.436 1.853 2.777 1.059 1.121 1.257 1.411 1.789 2.620
Welfare Loss 0.0032 0.0094 0.0264 0.0470 0.0955 0.1805 0.0018 0.0050 0.0130 0.0218 0.0396 0.0629 0.0019 0.0054 0.0146 0.0255 0.0498 0.0896
Rate of Recovery
 sector 2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Rate of compensative rebate
sector 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.6% -1.7% -1.6% -1.3% -0.5% 1.7%
Budget surplus 0.061 0.113 0.204 0.288 0.442 0.651 0.070 0.138 0.271 0.405 0.681 1.115 0.033 0.061 0.114 0.164 0.266 0.427
Relative
c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e 1 . 0 00 . 9 90 . 9 80 . 9 70 . 9 60 . 9 4 1 . 0 11 . 0 31 . 0 81 . 1 31 . 2 71 . 5 1 0 . 9 50 . 9 10 . 8 30 . 7 70 . 6 50 . 5 0
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Table 2. Commodities 1 and 2 as Substitutes 
No Pollution First Best Second Best 1 Second Best 2
δ 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.4 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.4 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.4
p1 1 1.056 1.103 1.191 1.278 1.455 1.753 1.061 1.117 1.228 1.345 1.604 2.106 1.008 1.006 0.992 0.968 0.902 0.771
p2 1 1.053 1.096 1.175 1.252 1.407 1.661 1.068 1.140 1.299 1.484 1.962 3.093 1.001 0.998 0.990 0.979 0.949 0.886
w 1 111111 111111 111111
q1 1 1.056 1.103 1.191 1.278 1.455 1.753 1.061 1.117 1.228 1.345 1.604 2.106 1.061 1.117 1.229 1.346 1.610 2.131
q2 1 1.053 1.096 1.175 1.252 1.407 1.661 0.990 0.978 0.948 0.915 0.842 0.718 1.001 0.998 0.990 0.979 0.949 0.886
t1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.053 -0.110 -0.237 -0.378 -0.708 -1.360
t2 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.162 0.351 0.569 1.119 2.375 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
C1 0.5 0.495 0.490 0.480 0.469 0.448 0.417 0.498 0.496 0.494 0.493 0.490 0.479 0.498 0.496 0.495 0.494 0.493 0.491
C2 0.5 0.496 0.493 0.485 0.477 0.460 0.434 0.495 0.489 0.474 0.458 0.421 0.359 0.500 0.499 0.495 0.490 0.475 0.443
L1 0.23 0.228 0.227 0.225 0.225 0.226 0.230 0.230 0.233 0.241 0.252 0.277 0.327 0.230 0.233 0.241 0.252 0.282 0.343
L2 0.24 0.240 0.240 0.242 0.243 0.248 0.255 0.235 0.229 0.215 0.200 0.167 0.119 0.240 0.239 0.235 0.230 0.215 0.186
L 0.47 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.468 0.473 0.485 0.465 0.462 0.456 0.451 0.445 0.446 0.470 0.472 0.477 0.482 0.497 0.529
1-L 0.53 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.532 0.527 0.515 0.535 0.538 0.544 0.549 0.555 0.554 0.530 0.528 0.523 0.518 0.503 0.471
RG 1.53 1.578 1.614 1.674 1.727 1.826 1.967 1.592 1.650 1.767 1.891 2.167 2.673 1.532 1.526 1.505 1.475 1.399 1.242
E1 0.5 0.416 0.378 0.332 0.302 0.262 0.220 0.418 0.381 0.338 0.311 0.273 0.231 0.418 0.381 0.338 0.311 0.275 0.236
E2 0.5 0.383 0.342 0.298 0.270 0.234 0.198 0.495 0.489 0.474 0.458 0.421 0.359 0.500 0.499 0.495 0.490 0.475 0.443
E 1 0.800 0.720 0.630 0.573 0.496 0.418 0.913 0.870 0.812 0.769 0.694 0.590 0.918 0.880 0.834 0.801 0.750 0.679
τ1 0 -0.078 -0.159 -0.335 -0.526 -0.956 -1.739 -0.078 -0.162 -0.351 -0.569 -1.119 -2.375 -0.078 -0.162 -0.350 -0.568 -1.119 -2.392
τ2 0 -0.078 -0.159 -0.335 -0.526 -0.956 -1.739 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
U 0.5103 0.4889 0.4700 0.4365 0.4065 0.3533 0.2851 0.4871 0.4648 0.4229 0.3834 0.3103 0.2140 0.4870 0.4646 0.4218 0.3810 0.3036 0.1967
π1 1.061 1.117 1.228 1.345 1.604 2.106 1.061 1.117 1.229 1.346 1.610 2.131
π2 1.068 1.140 1.299 1.484 1.962 3.093 1.067 1.137 1.288 1.462 1.897 2.893
Welfare Loss 0.0031 0.0092 0.0257 0.0457 0.0925 0.1743 0.0018 0.0052 0.0136 0.0231 0.0430 0.0711 0.0019 0.0054 0.0146 0.0255 0.0497 0.0884
Rate of Recovery
sector 2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Rate of compensative rebate
e sector 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 81.1% 88.7% 98.7% 105.4% 113.6% 118.5%
Budget surplus 0.062 0.115 0.211 0.301 0.474 0.727 0.071 0.141 0.285 0.437 0.777 1.402 0.006 0.007 0.002 -0.010 -0.042 -0.104
Relative
commodity price 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.95 1.01 1.02 1.06 1.10 1.22 1.47 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.1534 
 